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- ISBN:9787517061731
- 装帧:一般胶版纸
- 册数:暂无
- 重量:暂无
- 开本:24cm
- 页数:185页
- 出版时间:2018-05-01
- 条形码:9787517061731 ; 978-7-5170-6173-1
内容简介
本书从纯粹的数学和经济学角度, 针对不同的无线协作通信场景, 着重围绕系统模型、*优契约设计和协作激励策略等方面, 通过建立包括逆向选择模型、道德风险模型、混合激励模型、动态契约模型等多个契约模型, 详细阐述契约的理论在无线协作通信和网络应用中所涉及到的建模和契约优化的细节。
目录
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Wireless Cooperative Networks
1.2 Book Scope and Contributions..
1.3 Book Organization
Chapter 2 Contract Theory
2.1 Basic Contract Concepts
2.2 Adverse Selection
2.3 Moral Hazard
2.4 Summary
Chapter 3 Cooperative Communication in Cognitive Radio Networks under Asymmetric Information
3.1 Introduction
3.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
3.2.1 Source Modeling
3.2.2 Relay Node Modeling
3.2.3 Contract Formulation
3.3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information
3.4 Optimal Contract Design Under Asymmetric Information
3.4.1 Feasibility Conditions for Optimal Contract Design
3.4.2 Optimal Contract Design
3.5 Results and Discussion
3.5.1 Symmetric Information Scenario
3.5.2 Asymmetric Information Scenario
3.5.3 Symmetric Information and Asymmetric Information Scenarios
3.6 Summary
Chapter 4 A Contract-Based Model For Multiuser Cooperative Relay In Wireless Communication Networks
4.1 Introduction
4.2 System Model
4.2.1 Source Modeling
4.2.2 Relay Node Modeling
4.2.3 Contract Formulation
4.3 Optimal Contract Design with Single Source
4.3. 1 Problem Formulation
4.3.2 Iterative Algorithm
4.4 Optimal Contract Design with Multiple Sources
4.4.1 Problem Formulation
4.4.2 Iterative Algorithm
4.5 Results and Discussions
4.5.1 Single Source's Relay incentive
4.5.2 Multiple Sources' Relay incentive
4.5.3 Convergence Analysis of Iterative Algorithm
4.6 RNs' Power Constraint Effect
4.7 Summary
Chapter 5 Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism Under Moral Hazard
5.l Introduction
5.2 System Model
5.2.1 Source Modelling
5.2.2 Relay Node Modelling
5.2.3 Contract Formulation
5.3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information Scenario
5.4 Optimal Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
5.5 Results and Discussions
5.5.1 Symmetric Information Scenario
5.5.2 Asymmetric Information Scenario
5.6 Summary
Chapter 6 Contract-based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing Networks
6.1 Introduction
6.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
6.2.1 Utility of Mobile Users
6.2.2 Utility of Service Provider
6.2.3 Contract Formulation
6.3 Optimal Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
6.4 Analysis and Discussion
6.5 Numerical Results
6.6 Summary
Chapter 7 Contract Design for Relay Incentive Mechanism Under Dual Asymmetric Information In Cooperative Networks
7.1 Introduction
7.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
7.2.1 Source Modelingz
7.2.2 Relay Node Modeling
7.2.3 Contract Formulation
7.3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information Scenario
7.4 Optimal Contract Design under Single Asymmetric Information Scenario
7.5 Optimal Contract Design under Dual Asymmetric Information Scenario
7.5.1 Feasibility Conditions for Optimal Contract Design
7.5.2 Optimal Contract Design
7.6 Results and Discussions
7.6.1 Symmetric Information Scenario
7.6.2 Single Asymmetric Information Scenario
7.6.3 Dual Asymmetric Information Scenario
7.7 Optimal contract design with the RNs' continuous types
7.8 Summary
Chapter 8 Monitoring Strategy for Relay Incentive Mechanism in Cooperative Communications Networks
8.1 Introduction
8.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
8.2.1 Relay Nodes Modeling
8.2.2 Source Node Modeling with Non-Monitoring Strategy
8.2.3 Source Node Modeling with Monitoring Strategy
8.2.4 Contract Formulation
8.3 Optimal Contract Design with Non-Monitoring Strategy
8.4 Optimal Contract Design with Information-Monitoring Strategy
8.4.1 Stage III: RNs' behaviors
8.4.2 Stage II: MN's decision
8.4.3 Stage I: Source's decision
8.5 Optimal Contract Design with Action-Monitoring Strategy
8.5.1 Stage II: MN's Decision
8.5.2 Stage I: Source's Decision
8.6 Results and Discussions
8.7 Impact of RNs' Relay Effort Constraint
8.8 Summary
Chapter 9 Dynamic Contract Design for Cooperative Wireless Networks
9.1 Introduction
9.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
9.2.1 Relay Node Model
9.2.2 Source Model
9.2.3 Contract Formulation
9.3 Dynamic Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
9.3.1 Contracting Design in Period 2
9.3.2 Contracting Design in Period 1
9.3.3 Optimal Contract Design
9.4 Simulation Results and Discussion
9.5 Summary
Chapter 10 Conclusion and Future Works
10.1 Conclusion
10.2 Future works
References
About the Author
1.1 Wireless Cooperative Networks
1.2 Book Scope and Contributions..
1.3 Book Organization
Chapter 2 Contract Theory
2.1 Basic Contract Concepts
2.2 Adverse Selection
2.3 Moral Hazard
2.4 Summary
Chapter 3 Cooperative Communication in Cognitive Radio Networks under Asymmetric Information
3.1 Introduction
3.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
3.2.1 Source Modeling
3.2.2 Relay Node Modeling
3.2.3 Contract Formulation
3.3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information
3.4 Optimal Contract Design Under Asymmetric Information
3.4.1 Feasibility Conditions for Optimal Contract Design
3.4.2 Optimal Contract Design
3.5 Results and Discussion
3.5.1 Symmetric Information Scenario
3.5.2 Asymmetric Information Scenario
3.5.3 Symmetric Information and Asymmetric Information Scenarios
3.6 Summary
Chapter 4 A Contract-Based Model For Multiuser Cooperative Relay In Wireless Communication Networks
4.1 Introduction
4.2 System Model
4.2.1 Source Modeling
4.2.2 Relay Node Modeling
4.2.3 Contract Formulation
4.3 Optimal Contract Design with Single Source
4.3. 1 Problem Formulation
4.3.2 Iterative Algorithm
4.4 Optimal Contract Design with Multiple Sources
4.4.1 Problem Formulation
4.4.2 Iterative Algorithm
4.5 Results and Discussions
4.5.1 Single Source's Relay incentive
4.5.2 Multiple Sources' Relay incentive
4.5.3 Convergence Analysis of Iterative Algorithm
4.6 RNs' Power Constraint Effect
4.7 Summary
Chapter 5 Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism Under Moral Hazard
5.l Introduction
5.2 System Model
5.2.1 Source Modelling
5.2.2 Relay Node Modelling
5.2.3 Contract Formulation
5.3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information Scenario
5.4 Optimal Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
5.5 Results and Discussions
5.5.1 Symmetric Information Scenario
5.5.2 Asymmetric Information Scenario
5.6 Summary
Chapter 6 Contract-based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing Networks
6.1 Introduction
6.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
6.2.1 Utility of Mobile Users
6.2.2 Utility of Service Provider
6.2.3 Contract Formulation
6.3 Optimal Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
6.4 Analysis and Discussion
6.5 Numerical Results
6.6 Summary
Chapter 7 Contract Design for Relay Incentive Mechanism Under Dual Asymmetric Information In Cooperative Networks
7.1 Introduction
7.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
7.2.1 Source Modelingz
7.2.2 Relay Node Modeling
7.2.3 Contract Formulation
7.3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information Scenario
7.4 Optimal Contract Design under Single Asymmetric Information Scenario
7.5 Optimal Contract Design under Dual Asymmetric Information Scenario
7.5.1 Feasibility Conditions for Optimal Contract Design
7.5.2 Optimal Contract Design
7.6 Results and Discussions
7.6.1 Symmetric Information Scenario
7.6.2 Single Asymmetric Information Scenario
7.6.3 Dual Asymmetric Information Scenario
7.7 Optimal contract design with the RNs' continuous types
7.8 Summary
Chapter 8 Monitoring Strategy for Relay Incentive Mechanism in Cooperative Communications Networks
8.1 Introduction
8.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
8.2.1 Relay Nodes Modeling
8.2.2 Source Node Modeling with Non-Monitoring Strategy
8.2.3 Source Node Modeling with Monitoring Strategy
8.2.4 Contract Formulation
8.3 Optimal Contract Design with Non-Monitoring Strategy
8.4 Optimal Contract Design with Information-Monitoring Strategy
8.4.1 Stage III: RNs' behaviors
8.4.2 Stage II: MN's decision
8.4.3 Stage I: Source's decision
8.5 Optimal Contract Design with Action-Monitoring Strategy
8.5.1 Stage II: MN's Decision
8.5.2 Stage I: Source's Decision
8.6 Results and Discussions
8.7 Impact of RNs' Relay Effort Constraint
8.8 Summary
Chapter 9 Dynamic Contract Design for Cooperative Wireless Networks
9.1 Introduction
9.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
9.2.1 Relay Node Model
9.2.2 Source Model
9.2.3 Contract Formulation
9.3 Dynamic Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
9.3.1 Contracting Design in Period 2
9.3.2 Contracting Design in Period 1
9.3.3 Optimal Contract Design
9.4 Simulation Results and Discussion
9.5 Summary
Chapter 10 Conclusion and Future Works
10.1 Conclusion
10.2 Future works
References
About the Author
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