Preface
Chapter 1: Industrial Control Systems
An overview of an Industrial control system
The view function
The monitor function
The control function
The Industrial control system architecture
Programmable logic controllers
Human Machine Interface
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Distributed control system
Safety instrumented system
The Purdue model for Industrial control systems
The enterprise zone
Level 5 - Enterprise network
Level 4 - Site business planning and logistics
Industrial Demilitarized Zone
The manufacturing zone
Level 3 - Site operations
Level 2 - Area supervisory control
Level 1 - Basic control
Level 0 - Process
Industrial control system communication media and protocols
Regular information technology network protocols
Process automation protocols
Industrial control system protocols
Building automation protocols
Automatic meter reading protocols
Communication protocols in the enterprise zone
Communication protocols in the Industrial zone
Summary
Chapter 2: Insecure by Inheritance
Industrial control system history
Modbus and Modbus TCP/IP
Breaking Modbus
Using Python and Scapy to communicate over Modbus
Replaying captured Modbus packets
PROFINET
PROFINET packet replay attacks
$7 communication and the stop CPU vulnerability
EtherNet/IP and the Common Industrial Protocol
Shodan: The scariest search engine on the internet
Common IT protocols found in the ICS
HTTP
File Transfer Protocol
Telnet
Address Resolution Protocol
ICMP echo request
Summary
Chapter 3: Anatomy of an ICS Attack Scenario
Setting the stage
The Slumbertown paper mill
Trouble in paradise
Building a virtual test network
Clicking our heels
What can the attacker do with their access
The cyber kill chain
Phase two of the Slumbertown Mill ICS attack
Other attack scenarios
Summary
Chapter 4: Industrial Control System Risk Assessment
Attacks, objectives, and consequences
Risk assessments
A risk assessment example
Step 1 - Asset identification and system characterization
Step 2 - Vulnerability identification and threat modeling
Discovering vulnerabilities
Threat modeling
Step 3 - Risk calculation and mitigation
Summary
Chapter 5: The Purdue Model and a Converged Plantwide Ethernet
The Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture
The Converged Plantwide Enterprise
The safety zone
Cell/area zones
Level 0 - The process
Level 1 - Basic control
Level 2 - Area supervisory control
The manufacturing zone
Level 3 - Site manufacturing operations and control
The enterprise zone
Level 4 - Site business planning and logistics
Level 5 - Enterprise
Level 3.5 - The Industrial Demilitarized Zone
The CPwE industrial network security framework
Summary
Chapter 6: The Defense-in-depth Model
ICS security restrictions
How to go about defending an ICS
The ICS is extremely defendable
The defense-in-depth model
Physical security
Network security
Computer security
Application security
Device security
Policies, procedures, and awareness
Summary
Chapter 7: Physical ICS Security
The ICS security bubble analogy
Segregation exercise
Down to it - Physical security
Summary
Chapter 8: ICS Network Security
Designing network architectures for security
Network segmentation
The Enterprise Zone
The Industrial Zone
Cell Area Zones
Level 3 site operations
The Industrial Demilitarized Zone
Communication conduits
Resiliency and redundancy
Architectural overview
Firewalls
Configuring the active-standby pair of firewalls
Security monitoring and logging
Network packet capturing
Event logging
Security information and event management
Firewall logs
Configuring the Cisco ASA firewall to send log data to the OSSIM server
Setting the syslog logging level for Cisco devices
Network intrusion detection logs
Why not intrusion prevention
Configuring the Cisco Sourcefire IDS to send log data to the OSSIM server
Router and switch logs
Configuring Cisco lOS to log to the syslog service of the OSSIM server
Operating system logs
Collecting logs from a Windows system
Installing and configuring NXLog CE across your Windows hosts
Application logs
Reading an application log file with an HIDS agent on Windows
Network visibility
Summary
Chapter 9: ICS Computer Security
Endpoint hardening
Narrowing the attack surface
Limiting the impact of a compromise
Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit
Configuring EMET for a Rockwell Automation application server
Microsoft AppLocker
Microsoft AppLocker configuration
Configuration and change management
Patch management
Configuring Microsoft Windows Server Update Services for the industrial zone
Configuring the Cisco ASA firewall
Creating the Windows Server Update Services server
Configuring Windows client computers to get updates from the WSUS server
Endpoint protection software
Host-based firewalls
Anti-malware software
Types of malware
Application whitelisting software
Application whitelisting versus blacklisting
How application whitelisting works
Symantec's Embedded Security: Critical system protection
Building the Symantec's Embedded Security: Critical System Protection management server
Monitoring and logging
Summary
Chapter 10: ICS Application Security
Application security
Input validation vulnerabilities
Software tampering
Authentication vulnerabilities
Authorization vulnerabilities
Insecure configuration vulnerabilities
Session management vulnerabilities
Parameter manipulation vulnerabilities
Application security testing
OpenVAS security scan
ICS application patching
ICS secure SDLC
The definition of secure SDLC
Summary
Chapter 11: ICS Device Security
ICS device hardening
ICS device patching
The ICS device life cycle
ICS device security considerations during the procurement phase
ICS device security considerations during the installation phase
ICS device security considerations during the operation phase
ICS device security considerations for decommissioning and disposal
Summary
Chapter 12: The ICS Cybersecurity Program Development Process
The NIST Guide to Industrial control systems security
Obtaining senior management buy-in
Building and training a cross-functional team
Defining charter and scope
Defining ICS-specific security policies and procedures
Implementing an ICS security risk-management framework
Categorizing ICS systems and network assets
Selecting ICS security controls
Performing (initial) risk assessment
Implementing the security controls
The ICS security program development process
Security policies, standards, guidelines, and procedures
Defining ICS-specific security policies, standards, and procedures
Defining and inventorying the ICS assets
Performing an initial risk assessment on discovered ICS assets
The Slumbertown Paper Mill initial risk assessment
Defining and prioritizing mitigation activities
Defining and kicking off the security improvement cycle
Summary
Index
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作者简介
帕斯卡·阿克曼(Pascal Ackerman) is a seasoned industrial security professional with a degree in electrical engineering and over 15 years of experience in designing, troubleshooting, and securing large-scale industrial control systems and the various types of network technologies they utilize. After more than a decade of hands-on, in-the-field experience, he joined Rockwell Automation in 2015 and is currently employed as Senior Consultant of Industrial Cybersecurity with the Network and Security Services Group. He recently became a digital nomad and now travels the world with his family while fighting cyber adversaries.