包邮和平利用核能:核不扩散的法和政治

Preface 1 "Inalienable Right" to Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and the Changing Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime 1.1. Introduction 1.2. The Changing World: International Regulations on Sensitive Nuclear Activities/Technologies and Nuclear Exports 1.3. The Controversy over the Role of the NPT 1.4. Oudine of This Study 2 Historical Survey of the Pre-NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The Emergence of Dynamic Obligations 2.1. Introduction 2.2. The Sources of Dynamic Obligation: An Explanatory Framework 2.2.1. Uncertainty 2.2.2. The Forms of Dynamic Obligations and the Utility in the Security Issue Area 2.2.3. Normative Factors in Designing Dynamic Obligations 2.3. The Emergence of Dynamic Obligations in the Pre-NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime 2.3.1. Strict Technology Denial: "Genuine Uncertainty" ? 2.3.2. From Technology Denial to Atoms for Peace: Uncertainty and Ambiguity 2.3.3. Normative Factors and the Concept of Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy: Cases of Japan and Germany 2.4. Conclusion 3 The Making of Dynamic Obligations: the "Inalienable Right" and travaux preparatoires of NPT 3.1. Introduction 3.2. The Right to Nuclear Weapons and the Right to Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy: The Irish Proposals for a Shared Expectation 3.3. From Expectation to Substantive Provisions: Drafting the Ambiguity 3.3.1. Incorporating the Inalienable Right in NPT drafts 3.3.2. Article IV in the Final Draft Artide 3.4. Deliberation by States: Efforts for Clarification vs. Insistence on Ambiguity 3.4.1. Clarifying the "inalienable Right". 3.4.2. On the "Right to Participate". 3.5. Conclusion 4 The Afterlife of"Inalienable Right': Emergence of a New Regulatory Scheme in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy 4.1. Introduction 4.2. IAEA and Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy 4.3. Unilateralism in Regulating Sensitive Nuclear Activities/Technology 4.3.1. The U.S. New Nonproliferation Policy on Sensitive Nuclear Activities/Technology 4.3.2. The New Policy and the Right of Prior Consent: The Case of U.S.-Japan Nuclear Energy Cooperation 4.3.3. Policy Coordination and the London Guidelines: Adjusting Trans-Adantic Relations 4.4. Multilateralism Back and Forth 4. 4.1. INFCE and the NSG-IAEA Cooperation 4.4.2. Reinforcing Regulation: Controls on Duel-Use and Conventional Nuclear Items 4.4.3. Response from Developing Countries of NPT Party States 4.5. Conclusion: A Double Separate and Unequal 5 Intentional Ambiguity and the Rule of Interpretation in the Autointerpretation of"Inalienable Right" in NPT Article IV 5.1. Introduction 5.2. The Issue concerning Interpretation of Article IV of the NPT 5.3. Autointerpretations on "inalienable Right" and their prima facie Reliance on Article 31 of the VCLT: The Past and the Present 5.3.1. Restrictive Interpretation of Ambiguous Text 5.3.2. Object and Purpose 5.3.3. Subsequent Practice and Review Conferences 5.4. Conclusion 6 The Riddle of Treaty Interpretation 6.1. Introduction 6.2. The General Rule of Interpretation: Limits and Theoretical Pitfalls 6.2.1. The Object--Un-interpretable? 6.2.2. The Law - Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 6.3. Insufficiency of Rule-oriented Legal Thinking and the Problems of the Rule of Interpretation 6.3.1. Rule-oriented Legal Thinking and the Codified General Rule of Interpretation 6.3.2. Methodological Problems 6.4. The Constructivist Critical Views on Rule-Oriented Legal Thinking and Reconsideration of Treaty Interpretation 6.4.1. Constructivist's Basic Proposition 6.4.2. Methodological Perspective 6.5. Conclusion 7 Toward a Proper Understanding of Subsequent Practice in the Application of Dynamic Treaty Obligations 7.1. Introduction 7.2. The Traditional Concept of Subsequent Practice in the Law of Treaties 7.2.1. The Blurred Line between Modification and Interpretation 7.2.2. Subsequent Practice and Interpretation: Treaty-oriented and Customary Practice 7.3. Insufficiency of Rule-oriented Legal Thinking and the Problems of Subsequent Practice 7.3.1. The Constructivists' Contribution: "l-he Ontological Perspective 7.3.2. Subsequent Practice in "Interpreting" Dynamic Obligations and Legal Theories 7.3.3. A Practical Solution: Subsequent Practice and Good Faith in Treaty Interpretation 7.4. Conclusion 8 Concluding Remarks Annex: Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) Index